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I. INTRODUCTION
At the outset, we must acknowledge that the United States has a
massive Immigration Court backlog, the scale of which is staggering.
Any lasting solution must include dramatic legislative and executive
action leading to comprehensive immigration reform. However, in the
meantime, those that toil in this realm must persevere within the given
system, all the while maintaining the highest level of judicial standards.
Of late, this is proving quite difficult. In the name of addressing a highprofile backlog, reportedly in the range of 800,000 1 to 1,000,0002
pending immigration removal cases, the existing U.S. Immigration
Court system is under attack.
Over the past three years, there has been an alarming,
unprecedented, and widely perceived partisan encroachment into the
daily functions of the Immigration Court system. 3 The National
Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”), along with many others
in the legal community, argue that these incursions into judicial
independence are part of a broader effort to fundamentally alter how
immigration removal cases are adjudicated from a systemic standpoint,

1. Ashley Tabaddor, Insight: Immigration Courts Face More Than 80,000
Canceled Hearings in Federal Shutdown, BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 29, 2019, 4:01 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-criminal-law/insight-immigrationcourts-face-more-than-80-000-canceled-hearings-in-federal-shutdown-1 [hereinafter
BLOOMBERG LAW] (“The longest running government shutdown in history has
brought increased attention to our nation’s immigration court system and the impact
of the shutdown on the ever increasing backlog, currently at 800,000 cases and
growing daily during the shutdown.”).
2. Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases, TRAC
IMMIGRATION (Nov. 6, 2018), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/536/.
3. Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Border Security and Immigration
Subcommittee Hearing on “Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration
Court System,” 115th Cong. 1–13 (2018) (statement of Judge A. Ashley Tabaddor,
President,
Nat.
Ass’n
of
Immig.
Judges),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-18-18%20Tabaddor%20
Testimony.pdf [hereinafter NAIJ Senate Testimony]; see also
New York City Bar Association, Statement of the New York City Bar Association
Concerning the Independence of Veterans Law Judges and Immigration Judges, NEW
YORK CITY BAR (Nov.
28,
2018),
https://www.nycbar.org/medialisting/media/detail/statement-of-the-new-york-city-bar-association-concerning-theindependence-of-veterans-law-judges-and-immigration-judges [hereinafter NEW
YORK CITY BAR].
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and that such action is having deleterious effects. 4 From new case
quotas and deadlines imposed on Immigration Judges 5 to the Attorney
General’s referral of high-profile matters to himself for decision, the
effects are far-reaching. 6 A few dramatic instances involve the abrupt
removal of cases from an Immigration Judge’s docket 7 and repeated
docket shuffling, seemingly designed to make political statements
rather than addressing practical choices that serve efficiency while
preserving due process.
The so-called “deportation machine” 8 that some say this
administration is building squeezes Immigration Judges where they are
most vulnerable—their status as “employees.” If an Immigration Judge
provides one too many case continuances, even though related to a valid
due process concern, she risks being terminated. 9 The introduction of
the “machinery” into the judicial process threatens to eviscerate
procedural due process, though mandated by the U.S. Constitution. 10

4. See generally NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. See Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018). See also Letter
from Catherine Cortez Masto, U.S. Sen., et al., to Kirstjen Nielson, D.H.S. Sec. & Jeff
Sessions,
U.S.
Att’y
Gen.
(Sept.
13,
2018)
(available
at
https://www.cortezmasto.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Administrative%20Closure%20
Letter%20(Cortez%20Masto).pdf.) (The letter states, in pertinent part, “On May 17th,
Attorney General Sessions affirmed the BIA’s decision in Matter of Castro-Tum after
instructing the BIA to refer the case for his review, and used his authority to
unilaterally overrule decades of precedent by determining that immigration judges and
the BIA do not have the general authority to suspend indefinitely immigration
proceedings by administrative closure. Additionally, Attorney General Sessions
refused to delegate to judges and the BIA the general authority of administrative
closures and spoke of the “need” for currently administratively closed cases to be
returned to an active docket.”) (footnote omitted).
7. Debra Cassens Weiss, Union for Immigration Judges Files Grievance over
Removal of Cases from Philly Judge, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 9, 2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/union_for_immigration_judges_files_griev
ance_over_removal_of_cases.
8. Randy Capps, et al., Revving up the Deportation Machinery: Enforcement
under Trump and the Pushback, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (May 2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/revving-deportation-machinery-undertrump-and-pushback.
9. See generally NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.
10. Id.
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The political backdrop couldn’t be more fraught with, a highlypoliticized standoff between the President of the United States, who has
expressed hostility toward the Immigration Judge Corps, 11 and the U.S.
Congress, over how to fund immigration-related border security,
including the provision of Immigration Court funding. 12 This impasse
culminated in an unprecedented 35-day shutdown of the U.S.
Department of Justice, 13 with appropriations not finalized until four
months into fiscal year 2019. 14
During the shutdown, most
15
Immigration Courts were closed and it is estimated that some 80,000
Immigration Court cases, which were scheduled to be heard during
those dates, were essentially “shelved” until they could be rescheduled
to date sometime in the next few years. 16
This article will begin by describing the existing Immigration Court
system and will outline criticisms about its structure. 17 Then, it will
discuss the new performance quotas and deadlines for Immigration
Judges and explain why they have been criticized as not only
unreasonable and troubling, but also as counterproductive and
harmful. 18 Next, by examining erratic docket shuffling procedures
11. Steve Benen, Trump Asks Supporters, ‘What Other Country Has Judges?’,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/trumpasks-supporters-what-other-country-has-judges.
12. Erica Werner, et al., Trump Digs in on Border Wall Funds, but Democrats’
POST
(Jan.
30,
2019),
Opening
Bid
Is
Zero,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-digs-in-on-border-wall-funds-ascongressional-negotiators-prepare-to-convene/2019/01/30/56139e24-2488-11e9ad53-824486280311_story.html.
13. Lisa Rein, et al., Federal Employees Return to Backlog of Work After 35POST
(Jan.
28,
2019),
Day
Shutdown,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-employees-return-to-backlog-ofwork-after-35-day-shutdown/2019/01/28/10030766-231c-11e9-81fdb7b05d5bed90_story.html?utm_term=.6d9236d8370c.
14. H.R.J. Res. 31 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116thcongress/house-joint-resolution/31/text. (On February 15, 2019, President Trump
signed into law a $333 million omnibus appropriations bill that funded the federal
government for the remaining seven-and-a-half months of fiscal year 2019).
15. Mallory Moench, Immigration Courts in New York Stymied by Government
Shutdown, TIMESUNION (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.timesunion.com/news/
article/Shutdown-cancels-thousands-of-immigration-court-13549984.php.
16. BLOOMBERG LAW, supra note 1.
17. See infra II and III.
18. See infra IV.
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vulnerable to the charge that they are outcome-driven, the article will
explain the ways in which such actions impede due process. 19 This
article will conclude that the Attorney General’s wide-ranging efforts
to curtail Immigration Judge decisional independence threatens the very
foundation upon which the Immigration Court system is based, and
supports a wholesale restructuring of the system in the form of an
Article I Immigration Court. 20
II. IMMIGRATION COURT STRUCTURAL BACKGROUND
The Immigration Court is a component of the Executive Office for
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency housed within the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 21 Under its authority delegated by the
Attorney General, its mission is to adjudicate immigration cases by
“fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly interpreting and administering the
Nation’s immigration laws.” 22 Immigration Judges preside over
administrative removal proceedings at the trial level. 23 Because the
Immigration Court is housed within the DOJ, Immigration Judges do
not have structural independence. 24 However, since they are required
to uphold and interpret immigration laws and regulations without
interference, they do have decisional independence. They are held to
the highest standards of judicial conduct while administering and
interpreting U.S. immigration laws. 25
19. See infra V.
20. See infra VI.
21. See generally U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. for Immigr. Review, About
the Office, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (last
visited Nov. 2, 2019) [hereinafter About the EOIR].
22. Id.
23. See generally U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. for Immigr. Review, About
the Office: Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge (last visited Nov.
2, 2019) [hereinafter About the OCIJ].
24. See generally ABA Commission on Immigration, Reforming the
Immigration System, Proposals to Promote the Independence, Fairness, Efficiency,
and Professionalism in the Adjudication of Removal Cases, (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigr
ation/coi_complete_full_report.pdf [hereinafter ABA Report].
25. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. for Immigr. Review, Ethics and
Professionalism
Guide
for
Immigration
Judges,
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The EOIR’s Office of the Chief Immigration Judge is comprised of
more than 440 Immigration Judges, 26 supervised by the Deputy Chief
and Assistant Chief Immigration Judges. They report to a Chief
Immigration Judge, and she to the EOIR Director, who, in turn, reports
to the Office of the Attorney General—the chief law enforcement
authority in the United States. 27 The decisions of the Immigration
Judges are reviewed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
itself a separate component within the EOIR. 28 Although the BIA
operates through delegated authority, it is directed to exercise its
independent judgment in hearing administrative appeals of Immigration
Judge decisions. 29
At present, there are sixty-three Immigration Courts across the
United States, including those located within detention centers and
correctional facilities. 30 The Immigration Judges at each Immigration
Court preside over cases that are themselves initiated by a separate
executive branch entity: the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”). 31 The DHS component charged with initiating cases before
the Immigration Court is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). 32 Within ICE, the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
(“OPLA”) brings charges of removability before the Immigration Court
against those who it argues are present in the United States in violation
of the nation’s immigration laws. 33 OPLA trial attorneys represent the

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessi
onalismGuideforIJs.pdf.
26. About the OCIJ, supra note 23; see also About the EOIR, supra note 21.
27. U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of the Att’y General, About the Attorney
General, https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office (last updated July 17, 2017) (“The
Judiciary Act of 1789 created the Office of the Attorney General which evolved over
the years into the head of the Department of Justice and chief law enforcement officer
of the Federal Government.”).
28. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) (2019).
29. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice Exec. Off. of Immig. Review, About the Board of
Immigration Appeals, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals
(last updated July 17, 2018).
30. About the OCIJ, supra note 21.
31. U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t. Off. of the Chief Counsel, Office of the
Principal Legal Advisor, https://www.ice.gov/opla (last updated Mar. 6, 2019).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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U.S. government as civil prosecutors in all such removal proceedings
before the Immigration Judges. 34
III. GENERAL STRUCTURAL AND SYSTEMIC CRITICISMS
The Immigration Court system has received wide-ranging criticism
since its establishment in 1983. 35 In 2006, what had begun as general
concerns about professionalism, 36 became, in 2007, Congressional
Hearings about partisan, politically motivated hiring, 37 and, in 2010,
calls for large-scale reform by the American Bar Association. 38 This
article will focus on five of the most prominent areas of concern
expressed by leaders in the legal community.
First, public skepticism has never wavered regarding the
Immigration Court’s lack of independence from the DOJ. 39 In 200840
and 2018, 41 despite elevated professionalism standards for DOJ
personnel, 42 there were multiple scandals involving politicized hiring
decisions, including an ideologically-driven purge of the BIA. 43 Given

34. Id.
35. See generally ABA Report, supra note 24.
36. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration
Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 9, 2006),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html.
37. See generally DEP’T. OF JUSTICE OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, AN
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND
OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, (July 28, 2008),
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf.
38. See generally ABA Report, supra note 24.
39. See generally id.
40. Politicized Hiring at the Department of Justice, Hearing Before the
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 110th Cong. 2 (2008).
41. Letter from Elijah Cummings, U.S. H.R., et al., to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y
General
(Apr.
17,
2018)
(available
at
https://cummings.house.gov/sites/cummings.house.gov/files/Dems%20to%20DOJ%
20re.%20EOIR%20Politicization.pdf.).
42. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 2635 (2019), 5 C.F.R. § 3801, and 28 C.F.R. § 45
(2019).
43. See generally Shruti Rana, “Streamlining” the Rule of Law: How the
Department of Justice Is Undermining Judicial Review of Agency Action, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 829 (2009).
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the history of past bias, the current public is leery of all hiring decisions,
which are regularly scrutinized for ideological bents. 44
Second, politicization has created crippling funding disparities
between the DHS and the DOJ. 45 For many years, the Immigration
Courts were severely under-resourced, especially as compared to their
DHS. 46 For example, in 2012, the government spent $18 billion on
immigration enforcement—more than all other criminal federal law
enforcement agencies combined. 47 In addition, from 2003 to 2015,48
spending for the Customs and Border Protection and ICE increased
105%. The resulting impact of these funding increases dramatically
expanded enforcement capability, exemplified by the use of state lawenforcement resources for immigration enforcement. 49 Meanwhile,
Immigration Court spending only increased by a modest 74% during
the same time period. 50 These funding imbalances have contributed to
the severe backlogs. With fewer than 450 Immigration Judges, and
each facing rapidly ballooning caseloads, the sheer volume is dire. 51

44. Strengthening and Reforming America’s Immigration Court System for the
Subcomm. on Border Security and Immigr., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Sen. (2018)
(statement from Hilarie Bass, President of the American Bar Association Commission
on
Immigration)
(available
at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/HilarieBassStatement-4-18-18.authcheckdam.pdf)
[hereinafter ABA Senate Testimony].
45. See generally Fact Sheet: Empty Benches: Underfunding of Immigration
Courts Undermines Justice, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (June 17, 2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/empty-benches-underfunding
-immigration-courts-undermines-justice.
46. The Growth of the U.S. Deportation Machine, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar.
1,
2014),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/growth-usdeportation-machine.
47. DORIS MEISSNER, ET AL., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: THE RISE OF A FORMIDABLE MACHINERY 2 (Migration Policy Institute,
2013).
48. Empty Benches, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. IMMIGRATION COURTS: ACTIONS NEEDED TO REDUCE CASE BACKLOG AND
ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES (U.S.
Gov’t.
Accountability
Office
(GAO)
2017)
(available
at
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-438).
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Third, the Immigration Court system is susceptible to use as a
political tool in furtherance of law enforcement policies. 52 For
example, under a previous administration, mandated “surge” dockets
prioritized recent arrivals over pending cases. 53 Any public doubt that
political motivations prevented the orderly adjudication of Immigration
Court cases was surely erased following the highly-politicized standoff
between the President and Congress over Immigration Court and border
security funding. 54 The effects of the multi-week shutdown are still
being felt, and will continue to delay adjudications for years.
Fourth, since the Immigration Court is housed within a law
enforcement agency, and derives its authority from the Attorney
General, Immigration Judge decisions are susceptible to a perception of
partiality. 55 The role of the Immigration Judge lacks the fundamental
procedural protections present in other parts of this nation’s justice
system. 56 In the end, Immigration Judges are civil servants, deriving
authority from the top law enforcement officer—the Attorney General.
While they are charged with protecting due process, and have
decisional independence, they do not have independent authority to
apply Constitutionally-mandated due process standards.
Finally, of the many concerns expressed, likely the most troubling
is that Immigration Court proceedings lack basic procedural
protections. 57 Since immigration cases are classified as “civil” matters
as opposed to “criminal” cases, Respondents have no right to free
representation, 58 even in cases involving juveniles, mentally
52. NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.
53. Id.
54. Peter O’Dowd & Lisa Mullins, Week in Politics: Trump and Pelosi Still
Feuding over Border Wall Funding, WAMU (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://wamu.org/story/19/02/01/week-in-politics-trump-and-pelosi-still-feudingover-border-wall-funding/.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Ingrid Eagly & Steven Shafer, Special Report: Access to
Counsel in Immigration Court, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counsel-immigrationcourt [hereinafter Access to Counsel Report].
58. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 2011 § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(b)(4)(A) (2019) (providing that “the alien shall have the privilege of being
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who
is authorized to practice in such proceedings”); Orantes Hernandez v. Thornburgh,
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incompetent individuals, or detainees. 59 As a result, many have argued
that the system unfairly prejudices those unable to obtain
representation, or who suffer from a legal disability. 60
In sum, the Immigration Court system has received a broad range
of criticism, all of which implicates the fundamental integrity of entire
system. As a result, what is often suggested as the best means of redress
are proposals for restructuring Immigration Courts, which are discussed
further later in this article. 61
IV. NEW IMMIGRATION JUDGE PERFORMANCE QUOTAS
AND DEADLINES
The Immigration Court system is operating under a new existential
threat involving the recent imposition of a series of untested quotas and
deadlines. 62 As a result, Immigration Judges are now under greatly
amplified external pressure to accelerate adjudications, and the welldocumented structural defects in the process have been exacerbated
under these new conditions. 63
Although Immigration Judges have been subject to performance
measures for more than a decade, the current measures are designed to
directly infringe on decisional independence, which is in stark contrast
to prior approaches to measuring performance. 64 A leading scholar on
this topic, Brookings Institute Visiting Fellow, Russell Wheeler, argues
919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that immigrants have a due process right
to obtain counsel of their choice at their own expense).
59. An exception exists for certain individuals with serious mental disorders.
See Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 767 F. Supp. 2nd 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also
Exec. Off. For Immigr. Review, Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security Announce Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees
with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions, U.S. DOJ (Apr. 22, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/04/21/safeguardsunrepresented
-immigration-detainees.pdf.
60. Access to Counsel Report, supra note 57, at 15–16.
61. See infra VII.
62. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 7; see also Immigration Judge
Performance Quotas FOIA Request, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/foia/immigration-judge-performancemetrics-foia-request.
63. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 8.
64. Id. at 10.
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that performance measures imposed by the DOJ are agenda-driven,
unproductive, harmful, and devoid of useful meaning. 65 Although the
DOJ’s objective in implementing the new policy is the “timely
administration of justice,” 66 its quotas and deadlines have, in
application, curtailed Respondents’ due process rights. 67 Judges are
pressured to rush through decisions to protect their employment 68
because failure to adhere to the strict requirements imposed by the
Agency’s policy subjects the judges to discipline, including termination
of employment. 69 This has been implemented notwithstanding the fact
that many prominent community mem argue that the current quotas and
deadlines do not judge fairly the performance of individual Immigration
Judges. 70
Remarkably, the current measures fail to incorporate most of the
recommendations provided in a detailed and comprehensive report
commissioned by the EOIR itself. 71 That report recommended a
65. Russell Wheeler, Amid Turmoil on the Border, New DOJ Policy Encourages
Immigration Judges to Cut Corners, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (June 18, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/06/18/amid-turmoil-on-the-bordernew-doj-policy-encourages-immigration-judges-to-cut-corners/ [hereinafter Cutting
Corners].
66. ATT’Y GEN., U.S. DOJ, MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW: RENEWING OUR COMMITMENT TO THE TIMELY AND
EFFICIENT ADJUDICATION OF IMMIGRATION CASES TO SERVE THE NATIONAL
INTEREST (Dec. 5, 2017).
67. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 8.
68. Federal Immigration Judge Discusses Court System, C-SPAN (Sept. 21,
2018),
https://www.cspan.org/video/?451809-1/federal-immigration-courtsystem&start=348. (“‘This past week or so, they [EOIR] unveiled what’s called the IJ
dashboard . . . this mechanism on your computer every morning that looks like a
speedometer on a car,’ said Ashley Tabaddor, and ‘it has all of the numbers there and
80% of it is red and there is a little bit of yellow and a little bit of green. The goal is
for you to be green but of course you see all of these reds in front of you and there is
a lot of anxiety attached to that.’”).
69. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWS. ASS’N, AILA DOC. NO. 18092834, AILA POLICY
BRIEF: RESTORING INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE TO AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION
COURTS 1-2 (Sept. 28, 2018) [hereinafter AILA POLICY BRIEF].
70. Id.
71. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 69. See generally U.S. DOJ, EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REV., AILA DOC. NO. 18042011, LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY
REPORT (Apr. 20, 2018) (the report was more than a year in the making and compiled
by an independent, third party group) [hereinafter LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY
REPORT].
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judicial performance review model that “emphasizes process over
outcomes and places high priority on judicial integrity and
independence” 72 which is in marked contrast to the quotas and
deadlines fashioned by this Administration.
The following are five examples reflecting how the quotas and
deadlines are counterproductive and actually harmful to the Agency’s
mission.
A. Quantity over Quality
Under this Administration’s quotas and deadlines, Immigration
Judges are now required to complete at least 700 cases per year. 73 Yet,
the Agency has provided no evidence that a majority of the 442
Immigration Judges could meet such a quota. 74 This is especially
troubling given the wide disparity among the various Immigration
Court docket sizes.75 When the new policy was implemented, former
Attorney General Jeff Sessions reported, “We are now directing
[immigration judges] to complete at least 700 cases a year. This is about
average.” 76 As Mr. Wheeler states,

72. Id. at 21.
73. KATHERINE H. REILLY, U.S. DOJ, AILA DOC. NO. 18073084, IMMIGRATION
JUDGE PERFORMANCE MEASURES OVERVIEW 1 (June 7, 2018) [hereinafter Deputy
Director Presentation Overview].
74. See James McHenry, Director, Exec. Off. For Immigr. Review, Dep’t of
Justice, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’tal Affairs:
Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: the Year in Review (Nov. 13,
2019)
(available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/executive-officeimmigration-review-director-james-mchenry-testifies-senate-committee).
75. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3, at 3. (“The DOJ claimed that the
border surge resulted in an additional completion of 2,700 cases. This number is
misleading as it does not account for the fact that detained cases at the border are
always completed in higher numbers than non-detained cases over a given period.
Thus, the alleged 2,700 additional completions was a comparison of apples to oranges,
equating proceedings completed for those with limited available relief to those whose
cases by nature are more complicated and time consuming as they involve a greater
percentage of applications for relief.”).
76. See Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks on Immigration
DEPT.
OF
JUSTICE
(Apr.
11,
2018),
Enforcement,
U.S.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarksimmigration-enforcement.
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It is, but the “average” is meaningless because immigration courts
are highly diversified. Based on the Department’s most recent
published statistics (2016), almost two thirds of the courts had perjudge case completions below 700 and two-fifths were below 500.
Individual courts’ per-judge completion rates varied from under 300
in a few courts to well over 1,000 in others. 77

Moreover, under the new rubric, statistical “completions” are
limited to “dispositive” case decisions, 78 which fails to capture
administrative decisions 79 and variations in case complexity. 80 While
some Immigration Judges preside over dockets comprised mostly of
straightforward removal cases, in other courts, respondents’ claims are
far more complex involving requests for relief, creating lengthier and
more complicated cases. 81 Similarly, Immigration Judges that preside
over dockets comprised of large numbers of family cases may find their
completion statistics artificially inflated, by comparison, since each
family member counts as a separate statistic. (emphasis added)82
Consequently, requiring completion of 700 cases for all Immigration
Judges is both unreasonable and unrealistic because most Immigration
Judges preside over dockets with vastly different qualitative
characteristics. 83

77. Cutting Corners, supra note 65 (emphasis added).
78. Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 2.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.
81. Cutting Corners, supra note 65.
82. See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 2, “Lead and
riders are each counted as a completion.”
83. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes (on file with the author); see also Lomi
Kriel, Immigration courts backlog worsens, HOUS. CHRON. (May 15, 2015),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/
Immigration-courts-backlog-worsens-6267137.php (The Legal Case Study: Summary
Report reported that “Each immigration judge was handling over 1,400 ‘matters’/year
on average at the end of FY 2014—far more than federal judges (566 cases/year in
2011) or Social Security administrative law judges (544 hearings/year in 2007)
(National Association of Immigration Judges President Dana Leigh Marks estimate).
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B. Punishes the Provision of Due Process
The imposition of an artificial and unattainable quota directly
conflicts with due process because of the arbitrary time limits judges
must now respond to. 84 By extrapolation, the 700-case completion
quota mandates that Immigration Judges complete 13.46 full trials per
week, which equates to 2.69 full trials per day, at 2.97 hours per trial.85
This unrealistically assumes that Immigration Judges can be on the
bench forty hours of every week, and that each case requires only a
single hearing. These assumptions are unrealistic.
Immigration Judges are responsible for a range of duties off the
bench that support their work on the bench. 86 If an Immigration Judge
must allot 40 hours of the work week to the bench, this leaves no time
for additional case responsibilities such as coordination and
communication with legal staff about pending motions, guiding judicial
law clerks in decision writing, or even record review of the massive
volume of documents filed in any given case. 87 Even while on the
bench, it is common for judges to hold multiple pre-trial hearings to
address matters such as removability, the admission of evidence,
motions to terminate, custody matters, and a range of other issues
related to the eventual trial. Moreover, since many cases are held via
video teleconference, there are instances in which a case cannot go
forward as planned due to technical difficulties. Thus, when case
complexity and off-the-bench issues are factored in, along with
unforeseen circumstances (such as a snow day, a medical appointment,
or an interpreter issue) it quickly becomes apparent that an Immigration
Judge must weigh fairness and due process against the consequences of
failure to adhere to the new requirements and possible termination. 88
Even more worrisome is the exponential effect of missing even a
single completion statistic by one day because one completion statistic
lost means the Immigration Judge, to ensure compliance with the new
84. See NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.
85. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
86. Hon. Dorothy Harbeck, Borrowed Robes: A Day in the Life of an
JUDGES
JOURNAL
(July
1,
2017),
Immigration
Judge,
ABA
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2017/sum
mer/borrowed-robes-day-life-immigratijudge/.
87. See generally NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
88. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/3

14

Tsankov: Judicial Independence Sidelined: Just One More Symptom of an Imm
Tsankov camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2019]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE SIDELINED

2/4/2020 10:02 AM

49

policy, must make-up that lost statistic on another day, thereby
implicating due process concerns for cases scheduled for multiple
days. 89 Since complexity is not factored into the completion rate of
cases, an Immigration Judge who routinely presides over multi-day
hearings for a single case (presumably including testimony from expert
witnesses and record documents numbering in the thousands of pages)
will be disadvantaged and suffer greater exposure to discipline. 90 The
system equates a straightforward single-hearing, uncontested removal
case to a complex, heavily-litigated matter involving requests for relief,
and, either belies intellectual honesty or pursues an outcome-driven
agenda, where the completion statistic is the valued outcome. 91 This
one-dimensional approach serves neither the Agency’s stated mission,
nor the provision of Constitutionally-mandated procedural due
process. 92
The impact of this approach can be dire, especially in the context
of the thousands of children who appear in Immigration Court
proceedings, many of whom have been segregated from their families
and have no representation. 93 Because juveniles without representation
are particularly vulnerable, Immigration Judges must ensure the
integrity of the proceedings by taking additional steps to ensure fairness
in the adversarial process, as well as screening for issues such as human
trafficking, all of which requires valuable court time to ensure due
process. 94
The Agency’s mandated quota punishes the Immigration Judge that
affords due process by taking time acquainting herself with the
evidence filed, preparing for trial, granting a continuance to an attorney
who falls ill, or relaxing a strict time allotment in a hearing involving a
vulnerable juvenile respondent. The completion quota disregards the
qualitative differences in docket and case types, punishes too much time
spent on preliminary hearings for adequate case preparation, vigorously
ignores duties related to additional court assignments, devalues the
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Family Separation and Detention, AM. BAR ASS’N. (July 9, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_p
olicy/immigration/familyseparation/.
94. Id.
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crafting of written decisions in complex cases (since such work requires
time spent off the bench), and favors completions over quality of
decision. 95
C. Undervalues Judicial Preparation
The 700-case completion quota undervalues and, to an extent, even
ignores the time necessary for case preparation. 96 The inflexibility of
the quota artificially denotes Immigration Court cases to “widget”
status—identical in complexity and standardized in subject matter.97
Operating a court docket with such a notion not only belies reality but
fairness, as well. 98 Judicial reflection, preparation, and exactitude are
not only a bedrock of our judicial system, but are demanded by judges.
Moreover, immigration cases are ultimately reviewed through a
gauntlet of appellate courts, and, in some rare cases, reach review by
The United States Supreme Court. It is both unreasonable and
unrealistic to expect Immigration Judges to decide complex contested
motions, such as motions to terminate and motions to suppress, without
adequate time for review and consideration. 99 In this way, the quota is
troublesome because it fails to value the application of judicial ideals in
the face of highly complex and time intensive adjudications. 100 For
example, an Immigration Judge faced with a highly complex 12-hour
case, requiring testimony from multiple fact and expert witnesses, may
feel pressure to give short shrift to the litigants due to the quota.101
Similarly, pro se respondents with special vulnerabilities, such as
juveniles or mentally incompetent respondents, may require additional
judicial resources in order to present their case effectively. These pro
se respondents are ill-served by the quota. 102 This completion quota
presents an unreasonable and unattainable mandate that is not designed

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Family Separation and Detention, supra note 93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to preserve the value in preparation and judicial reflection, but to overemphasize speed of adjudication. 103
D. Arbitrary and Corrosive Remand Rate Quota
The second new performance quota mandates fewer than 15% of
an Immigration Judge’s decisions subject to remand from appellate
courts, including the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court. 104 Astonishing in its
simplicity, the quota fails to capture data in any meaningful way. 105
Remands to the Immigration Judge
__________________________________
Total Appeals*
* Total appeals includes appeals to the Board and Circuit Court.
Interlocutory appeals, appeals on motions, and appeals on bonds are
included. 106
This new bright-line standard does not appear to be based on any
empirical evidence suggesting that a remand rate exceeding 15%
reflects unsatisfactory performance and does not determine to what
extent an Immigration Judge’s performance is unsatisfactory.107
Rather, it takes two raw data points and reduces their meaning to a
deceptively simple conclusion. 108
The reality is that Immigration Court matters are remanded for a
variety of reasons. Although those reasons may include error on the part
of the Immigration Judge, often the reason for remand does not reflect
the Immigration Judge’s performance ability. A case can be remanded
for a variety of reasons outside of an Immigration Judge’s control,
including:

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 3.
NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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1) the need for further fact-finding;
2) the presentation of new evidence on appeal;
3) the need to have DHS complete background checks;
4) the dismissal of a DHS appeal;
5) a finding that the BIA lacks jurisdiction;
6) the desire to pursue voluntary departure;
7) the withdrawal of an appeal;
8) the application of temporary protected status;
9) the decision to administratively close a matter;
10) a change in or clarification regarding the law related to the
case;
11) differing appellate views on the exercise of discretion;
12) ineffective assistance of counsel; and many, many others. 109
With so many factors operating entirely outside of an Immigration
Judge’s control, drawing any conclusions about the “remand rate” is
generally meaningless. 110 Therefore, it is unreasonable to apply such
an oversimplified standard when evaluating Immigration Judges. 111
Although there are likely instances in which an Immigration Judge
issues an errant decision, and efforts should be taken to minimize such
outcomes, a standard that mandates such a high degree of precision is
arbitrary, exceedingly onerous, and counter to the regulatory
requirements that require measures to be “achievable” to be sound.112
When considering the enormous time-based pressures that are applied
to Immigration Judges, coupled with the range of factors outside their
control, this standard is devoid of accurate interpretation.
The simplistic standard could have the remarkably counterintuitive
effect of penalizing Immigration Judges whose decisions are not often
109. See generally Bryan Johnson, Statistics on BIA Remands of Immigration
Judges from FY2016–FY2018YTD, AMOACHI & JOHNSON, PLLC, ATTORNEYS AT
LAW (Feb. 21, 2018), https://amjolaw.com/2018/02/21/statistics-on-bia-remands-ofimmigration-judges-from-fy2016-fy2018ytd/.
110. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
111. Id.
112. See id.; see also A Handbook for Measuring Employee Performance, U.S.
OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT (Mar. 2017), https://www.opm.gov/policy-dataoversight/performance-management/measuring/employee_performance_
handbook.pdf (“Performance elements and standards should be measurable,
understandable, verifiable, equitable, and achievable.”).
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appealed. 113 For those Immigration Judges with low overall appeal
rates, the rigidity of the standard can skew disproportionately to reflect
poor performance when the measure is, in fact, simply reflective of a
limited data pool. 114 For example, an Immigration Judge with few cases
appealed during the performance period, a single remand can
inaccurately skew results. 115 Similarly, an absolute standard of 15%
fails to credit the fact that Immigration cases have not been appealed—
presumably indicating satisfaction from the parties and a satisfactory
performance by the Immigration Judge. 116
In addition, immigration cases do not take place in a vacuum and
often operate alongside collateral relief efforts. 117 For example, if a
Respondent gets married while an appeal is pending, a case might be
remanded so that the Respondent can pursue previously unavailable
relief. Similarly, a Respondent who files an appeal of a criminal
conviction might persuade an appellate court to remand the criminal
case for additional consideration and the criminal conviction may be
overturned. It is clear that the decision to take an appeal is both
complex and strategic, since an appeal is based on a host of factors,
(including whether a Respondent is detained or not), many of which
underlying the bald statistic are simply unrelated to an Immigration
Judge’s performance capability. 118
Finally, the imposition of an inflexible 15% standard is corrosive
to the process because it puts unfair and unreasonable pressure on an
Immigration Judge. 119 It unfairly holds an Immigration Judge
accountable for factors s/he cannot control. At its most erosive, it can
impel a judge to weigh the repercussions of a decision on herself, such
as whether such decision will result in termination. 120 Judges should
never be asked to choose between making a difficult, reasoned decision
out of fear that their case might be remanded, which, as a result, may

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I&N Dec. 405 A.G. (2018).
NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
Id.
Id.
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lead to termination. These are external pressures that should not be
introduced into any fair judicial decision-making process. 121
Moreover, there is no methodological evidence to establish this
data collection system is either useful or accurate. 122 There is no
publicly available evidence that the Agency’s examination of raw
remand rates is conducted in a reliable manner, devoid of data integrity
concerns, bias in application, and applied in a consistent, standardized
way. All of this leads to unfair and damaging actions by the Agency
with profound repercussions for Immigration Judges and those that
appear before them. 123
E. Deadlines for Selected Case Completions
Immigration Judges are now subject to a host of performance
deadlines which are designed to expedite various aspects of the
adjudication process, rather than measuring or valuing careful review
and deliberation by Immigration Judges. 124 For example, one of the
deadlines requires that 90% of custody review determinations be
completed at the initial hearing. 125 This deadline is arbitrary, and many
respondents are simply not ready for such a hearing at the time that it
has been scheduled. This can lead to Respondents withdrawing
requests to hold such hearings. However, concern about, the
performance measure might influence a judge to require a Respondent
to go forward at a hearing even without the parties’ adequate
preparation. 126
Similarly, another deadline requires that 100% of credible fear and
reasonable fear review proceedings be completed at the initial
hearing. 127 The lack of flexibility and failure to grant a continuance for
a new hearing date can result in the denial of due. 128 Consider, for
121. Id.
122. Id. See generally LEGAL CASE STUDY: SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 71.
123. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
124. See id.; see generally Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, As Immigration Court
Quotas Go Into Effect, Many Call For Reform, IMMIGRATIONIMPACT (Oct. 1, 2018),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/10/01/immigration-court-quotas-call-reform/.
125. See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 5.
126. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
127. See Deputy Director Presentation Overview, supra note 73, at 6.
128. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/3

20

Tsankov: Judicial Independence Sidelined: Just One More Symptom of an Imm
Tsankov camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2019]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE SIDELINED

2/4/2020 10:02 AM

55

example, an individual who has retained an attorney, and the scheduled
hearing date happens to fall on a day of religious observance or the
attorney is ill and cannot attend the hearing. An Immigration Judge’s
decision to grant a continuance places an undue burden on the Judge.
Although the Judge might recognize that participation by the attorney
is not possible, she also knows that granting a continuance may impact
her job security. To grant a new hearing date for a legitimate dueprocess protecting purpose would result in the Immigration Judge
failing to meet the initial hearing deadline, even if every other similar
type of hearing is completed at the initially scheduled hearing. 129 There
is no flexibility for due process built into the measure, even for
accommodation of a single due-process based continuance. This type
of deadline is orientated more towards enforcement, at the risk of
curtailing due process.
F. Universally Denounced as Due Process Compromising Incentives
Both scholars and legal community leaders agree that the use of
such unrealistic devices to evaluate an Immigration Judge’s
performance compromise an Immigration Judge’s independence and
erodes due process. 130 In some cases, these types of quotas and
deadlines create undue pressure on Immigration Judges to accelerate
hearings and decide cases without allowing themselves enough time to
fully consider the issues. 131
The NAIJ has called the standards the “death knell for judicial
independence” 132 and the New York City Bar Association has called
the quotas “neither efficient nor just.” 133 The American Bar
129. Id.
130. Id.; see generally Letter from Jill E. Family, Commonwealth Professor of
Law and Government, et al., to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Aug. 14, 2018)
(available
at
https://commonwealthlaw.widener.edu/files/resources/letter-tosessions-immigration-adjudication-with-s.pdf.).
131. Id.
132. NAIJ Has Grave Concerns Regarding Implementation of Quotas on
Immigration Judge Performance Reviews Before the S. Judiciary Comm. Oversight
Hearing (Oct. 18, 2017) [hereinafter NAIJ Senate Testimony 2017] (available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_6gbFPjVDoxX1hFUHRWNjdnMWM/.).
133. IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW COMMITTEE, QUOTAS IN
IMMIGRATION COURTS WOULD BE NEITHER EFFICIENT NOR JUST (N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n.
Apr. 10, 2018) (available at https://www.nycbar.org/member-and-career-
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Association has recommended an Immigration Court model that
embodies the ideals proposed by the Institute for Advancement of the
American Legal System. “These models stress judicial improvement
as the primary goal, emphasize process over outcomes, and place a high
priority on maintaining judicial integrity and independence.” 134
A commonly held view is that the central cause of the backlog of
cases is due to the DOJ’s failure to properly staff and fund the
Immigration Courts in the face of an imbalanced budget for
immigration law enforcement, and is not due to Immigration Judges’
lacking performance or efficiency. 135 As a result, performance
measures that emphasize outcomes over process are the antithesis of the
remedy for the backlog of cases. Since the backlog has grown as a
result of a decade-long delay in appointing an adequate number of
Immigration Judges to address the caseload, a solution that is too reliant
on curtailing Immigration Judges’ authority, and which uses unrealistic
quotas and deadlines will not achieve the goal of reducing that
backlog. 136 Ironically, the new quotas and deadlines threaten to
exacerbate the backlog. The integrity of, and the impartiality of, the
Immigration Judge are compromised by the appearance of a financial
interest in the outcomes (if not an actual financial interest), since the
very structure under which case decisions are made implicate due
process concerns. 137 The measures will likely generate individual and
class action litigation, creating even longer adjudication times and
greater backlogs, instead of making the overall process more
efficient. 138

services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/quotas-in-immigration-courtswould-be-neither-efficient-nor-just).
134. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44 (emphasis added).
135. Id.; see also Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, Still a Legal “Cinderella”? Why the
Immigration Courts Remain an Ill-Treated Stepchild Today, 59 FED. LAW. 29 (Mar.
2012),
https://www.naij-usa.org/images/uploads/publications/Legal-CinderellaMarch2012_1.pdf; Cristobol Ramon, et al., Why Hiring More Judges Would Reduce
Immigration Court Backlogs, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (July 25, 2018),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/why-hiring-more-judges-would-reduceimmigration-court-backlogs/.
136. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44.
137. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
138. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44.
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Immigration Judges serve as impartial decision-makers, rule on the
admissibility of evidence and legal objections, make factual findings,
reach conclusions of law, and have the authority to issue decisions
about removability. Yet, in juxtaposition, they are civil servant
employees subject to discipline and/or termination. 139 Immigration
judges have no fixed term of office and their removal and transfer are
subject to federal labor law protections and any rights conferred through
collective bargaining. This construct creates pressure on Immigration
Judges and by its very nature calls into question their independence,
undermining public confidence in their capability and neutrality. 140
Moreover, critics agree this organizational structure impedes the quality
of the Immigration Court system. 141
Such criticism dates back to December 26, 2000, when the DOJ
published a proposed 72 FR 53673, a rule in the Federal Register
revising the authorities delegated to the EOIR Director and the Chief
Immigration Judge. 142 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.2 was then modified to
confer authority on the EOIR Director to: “Direct the conduct of all
EOIR employees to ensure the efficient disposition of all pending cases,
including the power, in his discretion, to set priorities or time frames
for the resolution of cases[.]”143
It was also modified to permit the imposition of performance
appraisals, but required that, “such appraisals must fully respect their
roles as adjudicators.” 144 Moreover, the rule placed limits on the
authority of the EOIR Director, stating that “[t]he Director shall have
no authority to adjudicate cases arising under the Act or regulations and
shall not direct the result of an adjudication assigned to the Board, an
immigration judge, the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, or an
Administrative Law Judge.” 145
At the same time, 8 C.F.R. Section 1003.10 was modified to state,
139. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003 (2003) & 1240 (2003).
140. ABA Senate Testimony, supra note 44.
141. NAIJ Senate Testimony 2017, supra note 132.
142. Final Rule, Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge [72 FR 53673] [FR 50-07]
(Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Final Rule]. https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/
docView/FR/HTML/FR/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-123038/0-0-0-139104/0-0-0-140843.html.
143. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(ii) (2019) (emphasis added).
144. Id. § 1003.0(b)(v) (emphasis added).
145. Id. § 1003.0(c) (emphasis added).
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Immigration judges shall exercise the powers and duties delegated to
them by the Act and by the Attorney General through regulation. In
deciding the individual cases before them, and subject to the
applicable governing standards, immigration judges shall exercise
their independent judgment and discretion and may take any action
consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations that is
appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases. 146

During the 60-day comment period, three individuals submitted
comments about the authorities of the Director all of which related to a
concern that the setting of deadlines could impede judicial
independence. 147 They raised an alarm that setting priorities or time
frames for the resolution of cases could lead “an official to direct the
outcome of a specific case by setting an unyielding completion goal
which would prevent an immigration judge from taking the time
necessary to adjudicate a case fairly.” 148 One commentator asked
specifically whether the rule is intended:
(a) To authorize an official to establish time frames for particular
types or classes of cases which would be guidelines for the judges to
follow, but permit a departure from the guidelines in individual cases
when necessary; or
(b) to have an official direct a judge to cut short a particular case
regardless of the judge’s need to take additional time. 149

Another commenter went so far as to state that “the rule can be
interpreted to abrogate the parties’ right to a full and complete
hearing.” 150 This commenter would have the rule recognize that only
the Immigration Judge should determine the amount of time necessary
to complete a case.” 151
In responding to the comments, the DOJ stated that it, “does not
believe that the authority to establish time frames and guidelines
‘directs’ the result of the adjudication. Time frames and guidelines are
designed to ensure the timely adjudication and conclusion of
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. § 1003.10.
Final Rule, supra note 142.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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proceedings, and their use is well-established in immigration
procedure.” 152 To support its view, the DOJ referenced not regulatory
but statutorily-mandated completion deadlines. 153 It noted that asylum
cases have a statutory completion requirement of 180 days 154 and that
a credible fear review by an immigration judge has a statutory
completion requirement of seven days. 155 Furthermore, the DOJ relied
on the fact that “individual immigration judges set hearing calendars
and prioritize cases. Within each judge’s parameters for calendaring a
case, that judge will take the time necessary for the case to be
completed. Some cases take less time to complete, some more, and most
fall within the estimated times.” 156 The DOJ justified the finalization
of the rule unchanged stating,
Experience has shown that the time frames do not “direct the result”
of a particular case, but rather that the guidelines promote timely
results. The Department shares the commenters’ concern for due
process and fairness in immigration proceedings. Timely
adjudications ensure due process and fairness for the aliens in
proceedings, as well as for the government and its citizens who have
an interest in having cases adjudicated, benefits conferred, and the
laws enforced. 157

152. Id.
153. Final Rule, supra note 144.
154. Id. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(5)(A)(iii) (2019). In addition, the DOJ
referenced an unrelated Board of Immigration Appeals case management system
where single Board members are required to dispose of all assigned appeals within 90
days of completion of the record on appeal, or within 180 days after an appeal is
assigned to a three-member panel as set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(8)(i) (2019).
However, this type of deadline is not at all like the deadlines currently imposed on
Immigration Judges as it involves appellate review of a closed record, rather than trial
judge rulings in a fluid case being adjudicated in an Immigration Court over a period
of time.
155. Final Rule, supra note 144. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III)
(2019).
156. Final Rule, supra note 144.
157. Id. (emphasis added). The DOJ relied on the decisions of Capital Area
Immigrants’ Rights Coalition, v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 264 F.Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C.
2003) (rejecting challenges to the Attorney General’s reform of the Board’s
procedures in 2002); Nash, v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting
administrative law judge (ALJ) challenge to efforts by the Social Security
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This reasoning is flawed because experience is now showing that
the DOJ can and will create performance measures that impede judicial
independence which curtail an Immigration Judge’s ability to “set
hearing calendars and prioritize cases.” Under the new performance
measures, NAIJ argues that EOIR disregards the DOJ’s assumption that
“[w]ithin each judge’s parameters for calendaring a case, that judge will
take the time necessary for the case to be completed.” Doing so can
exact a heavy penalty, up to and including termination of the
Immigration Judge, at the expense of due process for litigants.
The politicization of our country’s judicial functions undermines
the fundamental democratic principles that Immigration Judges have
sworn to uphold. 158 For Immigration Courts to continue to be impartial,
Immigration Judges must be free to decide cases based upon the laws
and facts of the case impervious to either external pressures or internal
preferences. 159
Impartiality is impossible to achieve unless
Immigration Judges are independent and free from external threats and
intimidation, as well as from fear of sanctions on their employment
status. Immigration Judges decide matters of “life and death” for
people facing deportation at the U.S border. 160 One faulty decision and
an Immigration Judge can inadvertently return a Respondent to the
hands of their persecutor. 161 Because of such, these quotas and
deadlines are of particularly grave concern especially in hearings
involving vulnerable populations.
Administration (SSA) to improve the quality, timeliness, and efficiency of the ALJ
decision making process; “those concerns are more appropriately addressed by
Congress or by courts through the usual channels of judicial review in Social Security
cases. The bottom line in this case is that it was entirely within the Secretary’s
discretion to adopt reasonable administrative measures in order to improve the
decision making process.”).
158. In removal proceedings, a respondent has the right to a reasonable
opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him, to present evidence on
his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government. See 8
C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2015). The Fifth Amendment requires that removal
proceedings “conform to the traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process; and accordingly, statements made by an alien used to support [removal] must
be voluntarily made.” Cuevas-Ortega v. Immigration Naturalization Service, 588 F.2d
1274, 1277 (9th Cir. 1979).
159. NAIJ Senate Testimony 2017, supra note 132.
160. Id.
161. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol56/iss1/3

26

Tsankov: Judicial Independence Sidelined: Just One More Symptom of an Imm
Tsankov camera ready FINAL (Do Not Delete)

2019]

JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE SIDELINED

2/4/2020 10:02 AM

61

V. USE OF ERRATIC PARTISAN DOCKETING SHUFFLING MECHANISMS
Over the past three years, Immigration Judges have been
whipsawed through a range of policy initiatives as key law enforcement
tools in the Administration’s ever-evolving, “crisis”-mode immigration
policy. 162 Immigration Judges have dutifully accommodated a range of
policy implementations, including special temporary assignments,163
presiding over immigration cases involving vulnerable immigrant
children who have been separated from their parents, 164 and tolerating
unfounded public disparagement from the President of the United
States questioning the value of their role in the entire process. 165 Not
surprisingly, “The judges’ morale is the lowest it’s been in years . . .
[t]o argue or pretend like they’re not an integral part of the system and
that they’re not an integral part of the solution only exacerbates that
problem.” 166 More importantly, these aberrations from normal
operations are a worrisome distraction from attending to their primary
responsibilities—addressing the backlog and resolving cases assigned
to their home court dockets. 167
In 2017, the Administration began a series of rotating detail
assignments for Immigration Judges handling immigration cases at
border courts along the U.S.-Mexico Border in order to stymie migrant
162. Lorna Aldrich, Legal Panel Says Changes to Immigration Courts Create
Barriers to Justice and Due Process, NAT’L. PRESS CLUB (Sept. 28, 2019),
https://www.press.org/news/legal-panel-says-changes-immigration-courts-createbarriers-justice-and-due-pro.
163. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
Announces the Department of Justice’s Renewed Commitment to Criminal
Immigration
Enforcement
(Apr.
11,
2017)
(available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announcesdepartment-justice-s-renewed-commitment-criminal).
164. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Announces Additional
Prosecutors and Immigration Judges for Southwest Border Crisis (May 2, 2018)
(available
at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announcesadditional-prosecutors-and-immigration-judges-southwest-border)
[hereinafter
Southwest Border Crisis].
165. Eric Katz, Immigration Judges Are ‘Shocked and Disappointed’ by
EXEC.
(June
25,
2018),
Trump’s
Disparagements,
GOV’T
https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/06/immigration-judges-are-shockedand-disappointed-trumps-disparagements/149273/.
166. Id.
167. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
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entrants at the border. 168 At the taxpayers’ expense, large groups of
Immigration Judges were ordered to cancel their home court dockets
and relocate to centers along the border, where they were ordered to
adjudicate only those cases involving migrants detained while
crossing. 169 That program was scaled back significantly soon after
Immigration Judges began to report that, upon arrival, their caseloads
were nearly half empty. 170 “The problem was so widespread that,
according to internal Justice Department memos which were reported
widely, nearly half the thirteen courts charged with implementing these
directives could not keep their visiting judges busy in the first two
months of the new program.” 171 By May 2018, the program had been
retooled to involve supervisory Immigration Judges presiding over
border court dockets, in some instances by video teleconference. 172
Surprisingly, the temporary reassignments have been criticized as
having the opposite of the intended effect. 173 Rather than leading to
more rapid and streamlined deportations, and reduction of the backlog,
the “surge” of Immigration Judges to the border exacerbated the
backlog. When the policy went into effect, Immigration Judges sent on
temporary assignments had to cancel cases on their overloaded home
court dockets. From March 2017 to May 2017, the policy delayed more
than 20,000 home court hearings, thus exacerbating already overloaded
home dockets.
Next, the Administration announced a new policy and, “escalated
effort,” to address a crisis at the southwest border of the United States.
Dubbed a “zero-tolerance” policy, then-Attorney General Sessions
announced that the DOJ would criminally prosecute all illegal entrant

168. Id.
169. Meredith Hoffman, Trump Sent Judges to the Border. Many Had Nothing
to Do, POLITICO (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/
story/2017/09/27/trump-deportations-immigration-backlog-215649.
170. Id.
171. Id. (“Within the first three months of the program, judges postponed about
22,000 cases around the country, including 2,774 in New York City alone, according
to the DOJ memos. The delays added to an already clogged system: New York City’s
immigration court backlog stood at 81,842 as of July, according to the immigration
data tracker TRAC Immigration.”).
172. Southwest Border Crisis, supra note 164.
173. Id.
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referrals from the Department of Homeland Security. 174 This presented
a crisis because when an adult is referred for prosecution, a child
traveling with the adult is turned over to the U.S. Health and Human
Services Department, which is responsible for placing the child with a
sponsor as the child’s immigration case is resolved. 175 The policy
proved to be controversial as more than 2,000 children were separated
from their parents at the border between April and May, while their
parents faced criminal prosecution. 176 Following legal action and
relentless public pressure, the Administration reversed course, and the
policy was discontinued in June. 177
In 2018, the Administration issued a new precedent decision which
severely limited the grounds for granting asylum and reversed
previously established law. Matter of A-B- 178 overruled a prior
decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-, 179 which held domestic violence
survivors could receive asylum protection in some circumstances.
Additionally, Matter of A-B- attacked asylum claims involving harm
caused by non-state actors. This shift furthers the Administration’s
policy of separating children from parents who cross the southern
border seeking asylum. 180 Regardless, it vastly complicates resolution
of possibly hundreds of thousands of pending cases. 181 Astoundingly,
174. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney General Announces ZeroTolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policycriminal-illegal-entry.).
175. Salvador Rizzo, The Facts about Trump’s Policy of Separating Families
POST
(June
19,
2018),
at
the
Border,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/06/19/the-facts-abouttrumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border/?utm_term=.b022b181a1fa.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
179. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 338 (BIA 2014).
180. Eli Rosenberg, Sessions Defends Separating Parents and Children, WASH.
POST
(June
5,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2018/06/05/sessions-defends-separating-immigrant-parents-andchildren-weve-got-to-get-this-message-out/?utm_term=.6bb1bc819980.
181. Asylum Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B –
Matter of A-B- Changes the Complexion of Claims Involving Non-state Actors, but
Asylum Fundamentals Remain Strong and Intact, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR.
(June
2018),
https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-
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the Administration seems to be increasing the complexity surrounding
case adjudication while simultaneously imposing a one-size-fits-all
case-completion mandate on all Immigration Judges. 182
Given the breadth of the challenges facing the Immigration Judge
corps, including constantly shifting policy directives with unusually
high turnover related to the investiture of each new Attorney General,
Immigration Judge retirement has skyrocketed. 183 New Immigration
Judges operate in constant fear that they will be subject to discipline,
despite their diligence in attending to the massive backlog of pending
cases assigned to them. 184
In the midst of all these challenges, the Administration took its most
worrisome action yet in the case of Matter of Castro-Tum. 185 In this
decision, the Attorney General, in a case certified to himself, ruled that
Immigration Judges and Board of Immigration Appeals Board
Members lack general authority to administratively close cases, and
restricted administrative closure to circumstances where explicitly
provided by regulation or settlement agreement. 186 Administrative
closure is a useful docket-management mechanism that has been used
for more than three decades. It temporarily suspends removal
proceedings in appropriate cases while collateral relief, such as a
family-based visa petition, is being pursued, or while a respondent is
serving time in criminal custody.
After the Castro-Tum case was remanded to the presiding
Immigration Judge at the Philadelphia Immigration Court, Castro-Tum,
the Respondent, failed to appear for his hearing, and the Immigration
type/resource/documents/2018-06/Matter%20of%20A-B%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final%20-%206.21.18.pdf.
182. Daniella Silva, Trump Administration Begins Returning Asylum Seekers to
Mexico, NBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/trumpadministration-begins-returning-asylum-seekers-mexico-n964256.
183. Hamed Aleaziz, Being an Immigration Judge Was Their Dream. Under
Trump, It Became Untenable, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/immigration-policy-judgeresign-trump.
184. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
185. 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); see also Grievance Pursuant to Article 8 of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement Between EOIR and NAIJ, NAIJ (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4639659/NAIJ-Grievance-Morley2018-Unsigned.pdf [hereinafter NAIJ Grievance].
186. Id.
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Judge continued the case briefly on due process grounds. As a
consequence, the case was removed from the Immigration Judge’s
docket, and reassigned to an Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for
adjudication, following which Castro-Tum was ordered removed. 187
The NAIJ brought a grievance against the Administration arguing
infringement upon the Immigration Judge’s independence to provide
due process and noting that an additional eighty-six cases had been
reassigned for similar reasons. 188
The NAIJ argued that the
reassignment of the Castro-Tum case violated the trial Immigration
Judge’s decisional independence described under 8 CFR 1003.9(c), his
discretion to grant a continuance “for good cause” or to grant a
reasonable adjournment, and his ability to take any action deemed
appropriate under law. 189 Here, the exercise of the Immigration Judge’s
judicial independence led the Agency to reassign Castro-Tum and other
cases. 190 The Agency denied the grievance.
The NAIJ vehemently disagrees with the Agency’s decision to
exercise its power to reassign cases as in the Castro-Tum case. 191 Here,
the actions taken by the Agency infringed on an Immigration Judge’s
decisional independence, and while the Agency has the authority to
“assign” work, it must do so without interfering with judicial
independence. 192 This new trend must be stopped immediately before
it taints both due process and the Immigration Court’s impartiality. The
Agency violated that precept by taking the reassignment actions in this
case and other related matters on the affected Immigration Judge’s
docket. 193
VI. TOWARDS AN ARTICLE I COURT—PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
We began this discussion with an acknowledgment that any lasting
solution to address the massive Immigration Court backlog must
include dramatic legislative and executive action, leading to
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6
(2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 (2019).
190. NAIJ Grievance, supra note 185.
191. NAIJ Internal Union Meeting Notes, supra note 83.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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comprehensive immigration reform. In the absence of such reform, we
must identify and take steps to address the root causes of the backlog.
Underfunding the Immigration Court and then, once hobbled,
subjecting it to a series of untested and demonstratively ineffective
policies does not lead to a real solution. The Immigration Court is but
one element of an interconnected process. Solutions that disregard that
fact by experimenting with powerful policy levers undermine the
importance of the Immigration Court and harm our democratic ideals.
While we wait for comprehensive solutions, those that toil in this
realm must persevere within the given system while maintaining the
highest judicial standards. Of late, this has proven challenging.
Immigration Judges are not Article III members of the judicial branch,
and they do not enjoy the full independence that federal court judges
have. Additionally, they have increasingly limited job security. The
DOJ has the authority to set the conditions of employment for
Immigration Judges, including if, and whether, such employment
continues. While a DOJ regulation mandates that Immigration Judges
“exercise independent judgment and discretion” when making
decisions, as demonstrated in Castro-Tum, the Agency can infringe on
decisional independence unimpeded.
When the DOJ takes action that conflates an Immigration Judge’s
exercise of its adjudicatory responsibilities with enforcement, such as
with unrealistic case completion quotas and deadlines, confidence in
the system further erodes. Immigration Judges must maintain their
independence when hearing cases being prosecuted by a wholly
different entity—the DHS. Immigration Judges do not serve as
prosecutors and are not tasked with enforcement, but rather, their role
is to carefully evaluate another agency’s claims that an individual
should be removed from the United States. Instead of providing
adequate resources or implementing productive management tactics,
the DOJ has implemented case completion quotas and deadlines
disregarding the importance of independence, and fomenting conflict
of interest concerns regarding adjudicatory decision-making.
For years, the NAIJ has been calling on Congress to remove the
Immigration Courts from the Executive Branch and to create a separate
Article I Immigration Court. This model would offer independence for
Immigration Judges and build greater confidence in Immigration
Courts. The need for an independent Article I Immigration Court has
become increasingly more urgent given the experiences described here.
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As this article has discussed, the Administration is engaging in
alarming, unprecedented, and widely perceived intrusions into
Immigration Judge decisional independence. 194
Moreover, the
Administration’s varied policies vis-à-vis Immigration Court
proceedings in furtherance of expedited adjudications have proven
ineffective, as the case backlog has ballooned by more than 50% since
the beginning of 2017. 195 The answer is not to scapegoat the
Immigration Judges and demean the value that they bring to the
adjudicatory process. Nor is it productive to over-emphasize removal
at the expense of due process as doing so impedes the ability of
Immigration Judges to maintain the high standards that litigants
deserve. The creation of an Article I Immigration Court would improve
workforce professionalism and credibility. Third party stakeholders
including the American Bar Association, 196 the Federal Bar
Association, 197 and the American Immigration Lawyers Association,
have all called on Congress to create an Article I independent
Immigration Court to address these concerns.
In 2018, Rebecca Gambler presented prepared testimony before the
U.S. Senate entitled Immigration Court:
Observations on
Restructuring Options and Actions Needed to Address Long-Standing

194. NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3; see also NEW YORK CITY BAR,
supra note 3.
195. Immigration Court Backlog Surpasses One Million Cases, supra note 2.
(The Syracuse TRAC reports that “The Immigration Court backlog has jumped by
225,846 cases since the end of January 2017 when President Trump took office. This
represents an overall growth rate of 49 percent since the beginning of FY 2017.
Results compiled from the case-by-case records obtained by TRAC under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) from the court reveal that pending cases in the
court’s active backlog have now reached 768,257—a new historic high.”).
196. AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, ES–46 (2010),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
commission_on_immigration/coi_executive_summary.pdf; see also AM. BAR. ASS’N,
2019 UPDATE REPORT: REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 2–29 (2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
commission_on_immigration/2019_reforming_the_immigration_system_volume_2.
pdf.
197. Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, FED. BAR
ASS’N. (2018), http://www.fedbar.org/Advocacy/Article-1-Immigration-Court.aspx.
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Management Challenges. 198 She referenced a General Accounting
Office report from June 2017, which found that EOIR case backlogs
were of epic size, resulting from costly, ineffective case management,
and relied on outdated technologies. The Report stated that the majority
of Immigration Court experts and stakeholders interviewed favored
replacing the current Immigration Court system within the DOJ with an
independent Article I Immigration Court outside of the executive
branch. 199 The recommended restructuring would instill effectiveness
and efficiency in the system, increase the perceived independence of
the system, and improve the professionalism and credibility of the
workforce. 200 These are laudable goals, fully supported by the NAIJ. 201
The creation of an Article I Immigration Court is not the deus ex
machina which will would definitively solve all of the immigration
challenges facing the U.S. However, our Nation’s democratic
institutions are founded upon fairness and due process. The current
Immigration Court system is falling short of these ideals. An Article I
Immigration Court is but one aspect of the complex immigration system
that needs re-tooling. Taking the Immigration Court out of the
executive branch would instill trust in this honorable institution, making
it more effective in handling the fair, expeditious, and orderly review
and processing of immigration cases.

198. Immigration Courts: Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address
Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges, GENERAL ACCT. OFF.
(June 1, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-438.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See generally NAIJ Senate Testimony, supra note 3.
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